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FLAT-RATE TAX PROPOSALS 
IP0212F 
I n  r e c e n t  months t h e r e  h a s  been a  growing c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  advan tages  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  revamping o u r  c u r r e n t  t a x  sys tem 
f o r  a  f l a t - r a t e  t a x  method. 
Suppor te r s  of  t h e  new p r o p o s a l  a r g u e  t h a t  such a  p l a n  would promote 
p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  s i m p l i f y  p r e s e n t  IRS t a x  fo rms ,  s a v e  t h e  p u b l i c  b i l l i o n s  of 
d o l l a r s  t h a t  p r e s e n t l y  go t o  t a x - p r e p a r a t i o n  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  and enhance 
F e d e r a l  revenue by c l o s i n g  numerous t a x  l o o p h o l e s  and s p e c i a l  d e d u c t i o n s  
t h a t  a r e  now enjoyed by r e l a t i v e l y  few. 
Opponents b e l i e v e ,  however,  t h a t  t h e  t a x  burden  under  a f l a t - r a t e  
p l a n  might f a l l  more h e a v i l y  upon t h e  midd le  c l a s s  and ,  u n l e s s  e x c e p t i o n s  
were made, would h u r t  e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and c h a r i t i e s .  Problems 
wi th  popu la r  t a x  d e d u c t i o n s ,  such a s  home mortgage i n t e r e s t ,  would have  
t o  be  a d d r e s s e d .  
Th i s  packet  p r o v i d e s  background m a t e r i a l s  which d i s c u s s  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  
and t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e s  t h a t  su r round  a  f l a t - r a t e  t a x ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p r o b a b l e  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  t a x  burden under  v a r i o u s  r a t e s  and income b a s e s .  
A d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  p r i m a r i l y  i n  p e r i o d i c a l s  and 
newspapers ,  may b e  found i n  a  l o c a l  l i b r a r y  th rough  t h e  u s e  o f  i n d e x e s  such 
a s  t h e  Readers '  Guide t o  P e r i o d i c a l  L i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  Informa- 
t i o n  ~ e r v i s k  Times Index.  Congress iona l  
Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly Report  and t h e  ~ o m m e r ~ n ~ r e s s i o n a l  I dex 
a r e  commercial p u b l i c a t i o n s  which t r a c k  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  c u r r e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  
and a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  l a r g e r  l i b r a r i e s .  
Congress iona l  Reference  
D i v i s i o n  
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INTRODUCTION 
The idea of a flat-rate or proportional income tax has 
generated considerable legislathe and popular interest in 
recent months.' Many individuals, including some promi- 
nent tax experts, believe that the current income tax 
system has become a burden on the economy. They 
consider it to be far too complex, to provide too many tax 
breaks for upper income individuals and to promote 
economic inefficiencies. They see a flat-rate tax, on the 
other hand, as the antithesis of the current system. 
embodying the principles of simplicity, efficiency and 
fairness. 
Much of the criticism of the current income tax system 
has some justification. It has become an extremely com- 
plex and unwieldy system. It may seem that over the years 
the main rationale for the income tax-to collect the 
revenue needed to operate the federal government-has 
been obscured in the pursuit of secondary goals. 
However, most of the complexity of the current income 
tax system is a result of the desire to promote specific 
social goals which have broad-based constituencies sup- 
porting them. To give just two examples consider the 
cases of the deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
and charitable contributions. In each case the current 
income tax promotes what is widely viewed as socially 
acceptable and desirable goals, making home ownership 
more affordable to a majority of the populace and promot- 
ing charitable contributions. 
Additionally, the current income tax structure reflects 
attempts to achieve what is perceived as an equitable 
distribution of the tax burden. Although these attempts 
have produced some inefficiencies in the economy, the 
benefits must also betaken into account. It should be kept 
'The concept of a flat-rate income tax has been periodically 
discussed as an alternative to the current tax system. For an 
example of an earlier review of the debate see U.S. Library of 
Congress. Congressional Research Service. Progressivity in In- 
come Taxation: A Pro-Con Discussion. By Robert Tannenwald, 
Dec. 1976. 
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in mind that adoption of a flat-rate income tax would in all 
probability entail a major redistribution of the tax burden. 
To simplify the current income tax system, any proposal 
for a flat-rate tax would have to  address these and many 
other similar issues. Given the difficult choices involved in 
adopting a flat-rate tax, the purpose of this report is 
threefold. First, the practical considerations of defining 
the appropriate taxable income base for a flat-rate tax are 
analyzed. A discussion of the probable redistribution of 
the tax burden under each alternative income base is 
included. Second, the practical and theoretical issues 
surrounding a flat-rate tax are analyzed. Questions of 
behavioral responses, economic efficiency and equity are 
addressed. Third, an overview of recent legislative initia- 
tives in the area of flat-rate income taxes is presented in an 
appendix. \ 
I. ALTERNATIVE INCOME BASES FOR A 
FLAT- RATE INCOME TAX 
The definition of the appropriate income base repre- 
sents one of the more difficult issuesfaced by proponents 
of a flat-rate income tax. The flat tax rate needed to  
generate the required revenue will vary with the tax base 
used. The broader the tax base, the lower the necessary 
flat tax rate. There are three basic ways that a flat-rate 
income tax could be applied. It could be applied to the 
current law base of taxable income, adjusted gross in- 
come, or some expanded income concept. Each of the 
three income bases for a flat-rate income tax possess 
certain benefits and drawbacks. 
Regardless of the income base used, the transition to a 
flat-rate income tax would affect the distribution of the tax 
burden. The precise change in  the distribution of the tax 
burden would depend on the income base which is used. 
However, unless some form of low to middle income relief 
were included (say an exemption of a portion of income or 
a tax credit) a flat-rate income tax would produce a tax 
burden which would fall more heavily on lower to  middle 
income taxpayers than the present tax system. 
It should be kept In mlnd that adoption of a 
flat-rate Income tax would In all probablllty 
entall a major redlstributlon of the tax burden. 
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A. Taxable Income 
The drawbacks to using taxable income as defined in 
current law as the income base for a flat-rate tax are 
substantial. First, with taxable income as a base, the 
complexity of the current income tax system would be 
maintained. Itemized deductions and the treatment of in- 
vestment income account for a substantial portion of the 
complexity of the current income tax system. If taxable 
income were used as the base, there would be little 
reduction in the complexity of the income tax system, 
since both of these items would be retained. 
Over the years the main rationale for the In- 
come tax-to collect the revenue needed to 
operate the federal government-has been 
obscured In the pursult of secondary goals. 
Second, taxable income is the narrowest of the potential 
tax bases. Asa result, the flat-rate tax which would have to 
be applied to taxable income to raise the required revenues 
would be quite high. This high flat tax rate would produce 
two results. 
One, i t  would causeasubstantial shift in the tax burden. 
Low to middle income households would experience 
major increases in both their effective and marginal in- 
come tax rates. Only the upperincome households would 
experience reductions in their effective and marginal tax 
rates. Two, since the flat tax rate would be quite high, the 
benefits in terms of increased economic efficiency would 
be small. Only a small percentage of households would 
experience reductions in  their marginal tax rates and 
these reductions would have a negligible effect on re- 
source allocation. 
The only benefit to using taxable income as defined in 
current law as the tax base is that it would avoid the 
dislocations that would occur if the current deductions 
and preferential tax treatment of certain income were 
curtailed. 
8. Adjusted Gross Income 
Adjusted gross income (AGI) would be a somewhat 
broader income base than taxable income. AGI is usually 
less than money income, because certain types of income 
are excluded i n  calculating AGI. For example, social 
security, railroad retirement, unemployment compensa- 
tion and 60 Dercent of c a ~ i t a l  aains income are excludable 
from gross income. ~ d d / t i o n & ~ ,  certain other items such 
as contributions to individual retirement accounts can be 
excluded from AGI. AGI, whilenot as broad a tax baseas a 
comprehensive incomeconcept. would be a much broader 
tax base than taxable income (which allows exemptions 
and deductions from income). 
AGI would allow use of a lower flat tax rate to raise the 
required level of revenues. However, there are still con- 
siderable drawbacks to using AGI as the income base. 
First, the required flat-tax rate would probably still be 
higher than the tax rate faced by most low-middle income 
households under the current tax system. As a result, the 
distribution of the tax burden would shift toward the low to 
middle income groups. Second, the removal of itemized 
deductions would produce serious financial ramifications 
for middle income households. The economic behavior of 
these households has been heavily influenced by the 
deductibility of certain expenses such as interest on home 
mortgages and interest on consumer credit. Eliminating 
the deductibility of these items would severely penalize 
these households for past behavior. Finally, although the 
tax code would be somewhat simplified with the removal 
of itemized deductions, many sources of complexity in the 
tax code, such as the preferential treatment of long-term 
capital gains and the depreciation allowances, wolrld 
remain intact. 
C. Comprehensive Income 
Another, still broader tax base would be provided by 
comprehensive income. Although there are alternative 
definitions as to the specific Items which can be included 
in a comprehensive income base, under most definitions 
comprehensive income would represent a quite broad tax 
base.: For example, a comprehensive income base could 
include wage income, social security and pension bene- 
fits, all realized net capital gains, dividends, property 
income, and imputed corporate retained earnings. 
In the case of a comprehensive income base, the flat-tax 
rate required to raise the appropriate level of revenue 
would be substantially lower than the comparable rates 
under a taxable income or adjusted gross income base. 
However, many of the same problems would remain, such 
as the probable shift in the distribution of the tax burden 
toward the lower and m~ddle  income taxpayers and the 
dislocations and distortions resulting from the exclusion 
of previously deductible items. 
11. OVERVIEW OF PRACTICAL AND 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the technical issues of instituting a flat- 
rate tax, there are several practical and theoretical con- 
siderations which are important. For example, in terms of 
practical considerations it is of interest to know whether a 
flat-rate income tax is sensitive to inflation and how it 
affects the marriage penalty. In terms of theoretical 
considerations, it is Important to understand how a flat- 
rate income tax would affect horizontal and vertical 
equity, economic efficiency and individual behavior. This, 
section presents an overview of these issues. 
A. Simplicity 
Probably the most commonly heard critique of the 
current income tax system is that its complexity promotes 
both administrative and econornlc inefficiencies. There 
are two basic issues involved; one, the administrative and 
compliance costs associated w ~ t h  the current income tax 
system and two, the economic costs. 
Administration and compliance with thecurrent income 
tax code are costly and time consuming. Due to its 
complexity, a myriad of specialists have evolved whose 
primary function is to sort through and interpret provisions 
of the tax code. In lieu of contnbuting to the economy in a 
productive manner, these specialists spend their time 
developing methodsio minimize the impact of the current 
tax code. These efforis represent a resource drain on the 
economy. 
=For a detailed analysis of the components of a comprehensive 
income base see Dept. of the Treasury. Blueprints for Basic Tax 
Reform, Jan. 1977. 
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As a corollary, the massive amount of regulations which 
accompany the current income tax code promotes ineffi- 
ciencies in the compliance and collection of taxes. The 
average taxpayer is confronted with a multitude of forms 
and procedures when filing his income tax. As a result, 
due toeither outright avoidance or lack of full information, 
compliance with the tax regulations for a full reporting of 
income has declined over the years. This has produced a 
significant loss of revenue for the federal g~ve rnmen t .~  
In addition to the compliance and administrative costs, 
there are also economic costs associated with the current 
progressive tax system. Under the current tax system 
there are incentives to artificially shelter income from 
taxation at high marginal tax rates. These shelters take 
oneof two basic forms. First, investors time the realization 
of their gainstocoincide with periods when they are in low 
marginal tax brackets. Second, investments are made in 
instruments which receive preferential tax treatment. Both 
of these factors distort the efficient allocation of resources. 
Proponents contend that these excess administrative' 
and economic costs could be eliminated by broadening 
the income base under a flat-rate income tax. Since a 
flat-rate income tax would be extremely simple compared 
to the current system, there would be a dramatic decrease 
in the amount of resources needed to administer and 
interpret the tax code. Additionally, the simplicity of a flat 
rate income tax would promote better compliance and 
hence help prevent the loss of tax revenues. It should be 
noted, however, that by broadening the income base. 
much of the decrease in complexity could be achieved 
under the current income tax system. 
Proponents also argue that a flat-rate tax would remove 
most of the incentives to shelter income artificially. Since 
most taxpayers would face the same low marginal tax 
rates, there would be no tax advantage from timing the 
realization of economic gains. Finally, under most pro- 
posals for a flat-rate income tax, similar activities would be 
taxed at similar rates. As a result, investment would flow 
into those vehicles which offer the highest pretax return 
promoting the efficient allocat~on of resources. 
B. Inflation Sensltlvlty 
Under the current progressive income tax system, 
inflation-induced increases in income push individuals 
into higher marginal income tax brackets. For most 
individuals, the increase in income tax liability is propor- 
tionately greater than the inflation-induced increase in 
income. As a result of the combination of a progressive 
income tax and inflation-induced increases in income, 
most taxpayers experience a reduction in their real after- 
tax purchasing power. 
Under provisions contained in the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 the problem of bracket creep would be 
resolved by indexing the rate structures, zero bracket 
amount and personal exemptions beginning in 1985. 
However, a flat-rate income tax would also eliminate 
inflation-induced bracket creep. With only one marginal 
tax rate, inflation-induced increases in income would not 
push taxpayers into higher tax brackets and would have 
relatively little effect on their average or effective income 
tax rates. Under a flat-rate tax, taxpayers would experience 
little change in their real after-tax purchasing power as a 
result of inflation. 
=For a background discussion of this issue see: Molefsky, 
America's Underground Economy, CRS Report 81-181 E. 
C. Marriage Penalty 
Under the current income tax system two income 
earning individuals who file a joint return in all probability 
pay more in income taxes than they would if they were to 
file separate returns as singles. This is commonly referred 
to as the marriage penalty tax. It is the result of the 
different marginal tax rate schedules for joint and single 
returns. Provisions contained in the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 attempt to correct this inequity by 
allowing the lower income earning spouse to deduct a 
percentage of his or her income from taxation. However, 
in many instances the penalty is only partially offset, 
while in others the provisions create a marriage bonus. 
The problem of a marriage penalty or marriage bonus 
would beeliminated underaflat-rate income tax. Applying 
the same flat tax rate to both joint and single returns would 
eliminate the source of the penalty: marginal tax rate 
schedules based on filing status. 
D. Horizontal Equity 
If a tax system taxes individuals in similar positions 
equally, then the tax system possesses horizontal equity. 
Under the current income tax system, the principle of 
horizontal equity is violated, since individuals in similar 
circumstances are taxed at different rates. For example, 
consider the case of an individual with $10,000 of wage 
income and another individual with $10,000 of capital 
gains income. Under the current income tax system, the 
individual with only wage income would pay a substan- 
tially higher tax than the individual with capital gains in- 
come (capital gains income receives preferential treat- 
ment under current tax law). 
I 
Horizontal equity is a function of how compre- 
hensively income Is defined for tax purposes; It 
is not a function of the type of tax rates that are 
applied to taxable income. 
Most proposals for a flat-rate tax system include pro- 
visions which would broaden the income base and end the 
preferential treatment of certain types of income. Under 
this type of flat-rate tax horizontal equity would improve. 
However, the same degree of horizontal equity could be 
achieved under the current income tax system if the in- 
come base were broadened and the preferential tax 
treatment of certain types of income were curtailed. 
Horizontal equity is a function of how comprehensively 
income is defined for tax purposes; it is not a function of 
the type of tax rates that are applied to taxable income. 
E. Vertlcal Equity 
Vertical equity concerns the incidence of a tax among 
people with unequal incomes. The standard interpretation 
of vertical equity has been that tax burdens should be 
distributed according to taxpayer's ability to pay. In other 
words, an individual with a larger income should pay 
proportiondtely more of his income in taxes than an 
individual with a smaller income. With respect to income 
taxation, this concept of vertical equity is the rationale for 
progressive tax rates. 
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Most empirical studies of vertical equity conclude that, 
taken in isolation, the current income tax system ranges 
from slightly to highly progressive. However, when other 
taxes are included, it appears the overall tax burden 
(federal, state, and local) is roughly prdportional: 
Adopting a flat-rate tax does not necessarily entail the loss 
of all progressivity. If aflat-rate taxexempted afixed dollar 
amount of income from taxation then it would be a 
moderately progressive system. For example, consider a 
flat-rate tax of 10 percent which exempts the first $5,000 of 
income from taxation. An individual with $10,000 income 
would pay $500 or 5 percent of his income in  taxes. An 
individual with a $20,000 income would pay $1,500 or 7.5 
percent of his income in taxes. Hence, a flat-rate tax 
coupled with an income exemption is not incompatible 
with the concept of progressivity. However, regardless of 
the particular provisions for exemptions, adoption of a 
flat-rate tax would in all probability reduce progressivity 
when compared to the current income tax system and 
hence could result i n  an overall tax burden that is 
regressive. 
Adopting a flat-rate tax doer not necessarily 
entall the loss of all progresslvlty.. 
It should be noted, however, that the principle of vertical 
equity is a highly subjective concept because it is based 
on the assumption of declining marginal utility of income. 
That is, a dollar of income is considered to be more 
valuable to  a lower income individual (who is more likely 
to spend it on necessities) than it is to an upper income 
individual (who is more likely to spend it on non-neces- 
sities). A number of tax experts and laymen contend that 
the concept of declining marginal utility of income is 
much too subjective and arbitrary to serve as the basis for 
determining the structure of the tax system. 
F. Economlc Efflclency 
The economic efficiency or inefficiency of a tax system 
can be judged by its effects on relative prices. If the tax 
system distorts relative prices it is inefficient, since this 
distortion prevents the efficient allocation of resources. 
An income tax, regardless of whether it is progressive or 
proportional, distorts relative pricesand affects economic 
choices such as the choice between income and leisure 
and the choice between present and future consumption. 
For example, in  the presenceof an income tax, the price of 
leisure is reduced relative to  an individual's wage income. 
That is, to acquire an extra hour of leisure an individual 
would need only give up something less (depending on his 
marginal tax rate) than an hour's worth of wages. 
Since all income taxes are inherently inefficient, the 
goal is to design a tax which minimizes distortions in 
relative prices. It is often argued that a flat rate income tax 
is more efficient than a progressive income tax, since it 
would minimize relative price distortions. However, in the 
transition from the current progressive tax system to a flat 
rate tax some individuals would experience increases in 
S e e  Pechman and Okner. Who Bears the Tax Burden? 
Brookings Institution. 1974. 
their marginal tax rates while others would experience 
decreases in their marginal tax rates. 
Unless some form of low to mlddle lncome 
rellef were included ... a flat-rate lncome tax 
would produce a fax burden which would fall 
more heavily on lower to mlddle income tax- 
payers than the present tax system. 
Taxpayers whose marginal tax rates decrease would 
experience a reduction in the distortion between the price 
of income versus leisure. This would tend to reduce the 
inefficiency of the tax system. On the other hand, tax- 
payers whose marginal tax rates increase would experi- 
ence an increase in the distortion between the price of 
income versus leisure, which, in turn, would increase the 
inefficiency of the tax system. Because of these offsetting 
effects it is not clear whether a flat-rate tax would increase 
the overall economic efficiency of the tax system. 
Proponents of a flat-rate tax also contend that in 
response to reductions in marginal tax rates, individuals 
will tend to increase their work efforts. That is, since the 
price of leisure will rise relative to the price of income, 
individuals will substitute income for leisure. However, as 
pointed out earlier, under a flat-rate tax, some individuals 
would experience reductions while others would experi- 
ence increases in their marginal tax rates. Therefore, while 
some individuals might substitute income for leisure 
(since the price of leisure will rise relative to the price of 
income) others might substitute leisure for income (since 
the price of leisure will fall relative to the price of income). 
For this reason, the effects of a flat-rate tax on the 
aggregate work level are uncertain. 
The effects of a flat-rate tax on the aggregate 
work level are uncertain. 
An additional factor to consider when discussing be- 
havioral responses is the income effects of a change in 
relative prices. As opposed to the substitution eftect, 
which depends on the change in the marginal rate of tax, 
the incomeeffect is a function of the change in the average 
rate of tax. If a reduction in an individual's marginal tax 
rate coincides with a reduction In his average tax rate, then 
the substitution effect might be offset by the income 
effect. In this case, the individual's income will increase 
(due to the reduction in his average tax rate) and he will be 
able to consume more of everything, including leisure. 
Most empirical studies indicate that the substitution and 
income effects of a reduction in marginal and average tax 
rates tend to cancel each other producing little or noeffect 
on work effort5 
5See Dept. of Treasury, Can Tax Revenues Go Up When Tax 
Rates Go Down?, by Don Fullerton, OTA Paper 41. Sept. 19.30. 
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APPENDIX 
Legislative Initiatives 
Nine bills have been introduced (six in the House and three in 
the Senate) all of which address the issue of a flat rate lncome tax 
or an expanded income base. A brief synopsis of the pertinent 
aspects of each of these bills  follow^.^ 
H.R. 3181. (Introduced: April 9, 1981; Sponsors: Rep. Leon E. 
Panetta. D-Calif., et al.) Synops~s. Repeals all itemized deductions 
for individuals except deductions relating to the production of 
income or alimony or support payments. Substitutes an income 
tax credit for the personal exemption. Abolishes the tax schedule 
for heads of households. 
H.R. 4821. (Introduced: October 22.1981 ; Sponsor: Rep. George 
Bansen, R-Idaho.) Synopsis: 
Amends the lnternal Revenue Code to repeal the income tax 
tables. Provides for an income tax rate of 14 percent for all 
indtviduals, estates, and trusts. 
Redefines "adjusted gross income" to eliminate the deduc- 
tions from gross income for the following: (1) long-term 
capital gains; (2) moving expenses; (3) retirement savings;, 
and (4) repayments of supplemental unemployment com- 
pensation benefits. 
Deflnes "allowable itemized deductions" as any deduction 
attributable to: (1 ) expensesfor the production of income; (2) 
contributions to a church or convention or association of 
churches: (3) medical and dental expenses; and (4) alimony 
or separate maintenance payments. 
Repeals the deduct~ons for: (1) interest, taxes, and depre- 
clat~on of cooperative housing; (2) moving expenses; (3) 
retirement savings; (4) abortion expenses; and (5) long-term 
capital gains. 
H.R. 5513. (Introduced: February 10,1982; Sponsor: Rep. Philip 
M Crane. R-Ill.) Synopsis: 
Amends the lnternal Revenue Code to repeal the income tax 
T h e  abstracts of these bills were prepared by the Bill Digest 
unit of the American Law Division of the Congressional Research 
Service 
tables. Provides for an income tax rate of 10 percent for all 
individuals, estates, and trusts. 
Repeals all special tax deductions, credits, and exclusions 
from incomes for individuals. Amends the Economtc 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 toincrease to$2.000 the deduction 
for personal exemptions. 
S. 2147. (Introduced: March 1, 1982; Sponsor: Sen. Denn~s 
DeConcini, R-Ariz.) Synopsis: 
Requires that the lnternal Revenue Code be amended to 
provide that after 1985, all income should be taxed at a rate of 
20 percent or less. 
Sets forth guidelines for a new income tax scheme. Requlres 
the Secretary of the Treasury to propose legislation to 
implement this Act. 
S. 2200. (Introduced: March 15, 1982; Sponsor: Sen Jesse 
Helms. R-N.C.) Synopsis: Companion bill to H.R. 5513. 
H.R. 5868. (Introduced: March 17, 1982; Sponsor: Rep. Kent 
Hance, D-Tex.) Synopsis: Directs the Secretary of the Treasury or 
his delegate to conduct a study of the advisability of replacing the 
current federal income tax system for individuals and corpora- 
tions with a system under which income tax is imposed on gross 
income. 
H.R. 8070. (Introduced: April 5, 1982; Sponsor: Rep. Leon E. 
Panetta, D-Calif. et el.) Synopsis: Eliminates most deductions, 
credits and exclusions. Establ~shes a 19 percent tax on gross 
income, less basic business expenses. Establishes tax credits of 
S1,OOOfor an individual. $l,WOfora spouse, $200 per dependent, 
and $200 for individuals who are blind or over 65. 
S. 2376. (Introduced: April 15. 1982; Sponsor: Sen. Charles E 
Grassley. R-Iowa.) Synopsis: Directs theTreasury Department to 
study the feasibility of replacing the current income tax for 
individuals and corporations with a flat-rate tax on various in- 
come bases. 
H.R. 6352. (Introduced: May 11, 1982; Sponsor: Rep. Ron Paul, 
R-Tex.) Synopsis: 
Amends the lnternal Revenue Code to provide that a 10 
percent income tax rate shall apply to all individuals. 
Repeals all deductions, credits, and exclusions for individ- 
uals other than an exemption of $10,000. 
ESTIMATES OF FLAT INCOME 
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The concept of a flat-rate, or proportional, income tax 
has long held wideattraction becauseof its simplicity and 
its underpinnings with regard to tax equity. Proposals for 
the institution of a flat-rate federal income tax are 
advanced perennially, and the potential revenue implica- 
tions of the proposals are among the foremost issues 
debated. A resolution, directing the Treasury Department 
to complete a study on the feasibility of replacing the 
current tax system with a flat percentage rate of tax on all 
forms of personal and corporate income, was introduced 
by a bipartisan gtoup of House Ways and Means Commit- 
tee members. The resolution callsfor the study to assume 
that economically disadvantaged families would be 
exempt, paperwork reduced, and economic disincentives 
removed by the new tax system. Additionally, strengths 
and weaknesses are to be identified with possible solu- 
tions. Thestudy would be in two parts; the first would look 
at only replacing the current personal income tax while 
the second would focus on replacing both business and 
personal income taxes.2 
The chief purpose of any tax system, proportional or 
progressive, is to raise the revenue needed for the opera- 
tions of government. This report examines the flat tax 
rates necessary to generate the 1980 level of federal 
individual income tax revenues, under various income tax 
bases.) It is intended as a companion piece to the CRS 
reports, Progressivity in  :ncome Taxation: A Pro-Con 
Discussion (December 28, 1976) by Robert Tannenwald, 
and An Overview of the Issues Concerning a Flat-Rate 
Income Tax (May 26, 1982) by Gregg A. Esenwein. 
The rate of tax necessary to generate a level of revenue 
equal to that generated by current law will vary according 
to the income tax base with which it is used; the broader 
the tax base, the lower the necessary income tax rate. 
Therefore, proposals for the institution of a flat-rate 
federal individual income tax often have as corollaries the 
broadening of the tax base.' The broadening of the tax 
base would entail the reduction of or the outright elimina- 
tion of various tax exemptions, deductions, exclusions, 
and preferences which the tax code now includes. (Some 
proposals also call for the imputation of net undistributed 
corporated income to shareholders and the elimination of 
the-corporate income tax.) This report examines the flat 
tax rates necessary to raise 1980 levels of individual in- 
come tax revenues given various income tax bases, which 
range from the narrow (taxable income) to the quite broad 
(comprehensive income). 
Besides the simple revenue effects the institution of a 
flat-rate tax would bring about, a switch to a proportional 
income tax could entail distributional effects. These 
effects would be changes in how the aggregate tax burden 
is distributed over income classes. For example. one 
would expect to find that a greater percentage of the 
overall tax burden would fall on lower income classes 
under a proportional tax than under a progressive tax rate 
system. The precise change in the distribution of the tax 
burden over income classes would depend partly upon the 
income tax base which is used. A truly comprehensive tax 
base with no exemptions whatsoever coupled with a flat- 
rate income tax would result in a tax burden which falls 
'Interested readers should see: U.S. Treasury Department. 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform. Washington. US. Govt. Print. 
Off.. January 17.1977; and: Pechman, Joseph, ed. Comprehen- 
sive Income Taxation. Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C., 
1977. Also of interest is: Brazer, Harvey E. "The Income Tax in the 
Federal Revenue System." in Musgrave. Richard A,. ed. Broad- 
based Taxes, New Options and Sources. 
'This paper is based on an earlier report: U.S. Library of 
Congress. Congressional Research Service. Estimates of Rat 
lncome Tax Rates Necessary to Raise 1976 Level of Federal 
lncome Tax Revenues, Using Various Tax Bases, by John Karr. 
June 21. 1978. 
?Tax Legislation: Tax Writers Introduce Resolution on Gross 
Income Tax Study. Daily Tax Report, The Bureau of National 
Affairs, Inc. March 17, 1982, No. 52, p. G5 and G6. 
lstatistics for 1980 are the most recent available which provide 
information by size of adjusted gross income. 
--- 
The tlat-rate taxes necessary. . . to generate the 
1980 level of.  . .revenues are: system one, 11.8 
percent; system two, 18.5percent; system three, 
15.7 percent; and system tour, 18.7 percent. 
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more heavily on lower income classes than the same tax 
rate on a less comprehensive tax base. However, the intent 
behind the institution of a flat-rate tax may be in  fact to  
avoid the "progressive" distribution of the tax burden over 
income classes (i.e., a tax burden which falls more heavily 
on upper-income taxpayers than on lower-income tax- 
payers). 
Table 1 below presents actual 1980 levels of adjusted 
gross income (AGI), taxable income (TI), and federal 
individual income tax liability by category of AGI. From 
the table, the tax rate necessary to generate equivalent 
revenues according to the tax base used can be deter- 
mined. The revenue a flat-rate tax must generate to 
provide an amount equal to total federal individual income 
tax collections (at 1980 levels) is about $248.4 billion. 
The first income base measure examined is taxable in- 
come (TI). TI  is the most narrowly defined income tax 
base, consisting of gross income after exclusions, adjust- 
ments, exemptions, and ded~ct ions .~The use of TI  as a tax 
SDefinitions of these terms can be found in: U.S. Library of 
Congress. Congressional Research Service. An Explanation of 
Federal Individual lncome Tax Terms, by Morgan Frankel and 
Louis Talley. May 17, 1980. (Repolt No. 80-98 E). 
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Totala $1,606,265,685 $1,273,558,004 $248,400,602 100.1 
'Not equal to 100.0 percent due to rounding. 
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Statistics of lncome Bulletm, winter 1981-82. Washington, D.C., 1982. 
Table 2 
ESTIMATED TAX REVENUE GENERATED BY A FLAT-RATE 19.5 PERCENT 
TAX ON TAXABLE INCOME AT 1980 LEVELS 
Adjusted Gross Income Total Taxable Income Estimated Tax Revenues Percent of Total Cumulative Percent 
(thousands) (thousands) 
$ 1-$4,999 $ 26,042,856 $ 5,078,357 2.0 2.0 
5,000- 9,999 97,138,635 18,942,034 7.6 9.6 
10,000-1 9,999 293,346,121 57,202,494 23.0 32.6 
20,000-29,999 31 4,863,747 61,398,431 24.7 57.3 
30,000-49,999 328,697,987 64,096,107 25.8 83.1 
50,000 and over 21 3,468,658 41,626,388 16.8 99.9 
Total' $1,273,558.004 $248,343,811 99.0 99.9 
'Not equal to 100.0 percent due to rounding. 
Source: Author's calculations based on IRS data 
Table 3 
ESTIMATED TAX REVENUE GENERATED BY A FLAT-RATE 15.5 PERCENT 
TAX ON ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME AT 1980 LEVELS 



























'Not equal to 100.0 percent due to rounding. 
Source: Author's calculations based on IRS data. 
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base would not provide much simplicity due to the many 
rules regarding allowable deductions, limits on adjust- 
ments. etc. TI for 1980 totaled about $1,273.6 billion. In 
order to generate income tax collections of approximately 
$248.4 billion, a tax rate of roughly 19.5 peccent would 
have to be applied. Table 2 presents estimates of the tax 
revenues that would be collected in each category of AGI 
under a 19.5 percent tax on TI (at 1980 levels). 
Adjusted gross income (AGI) would be a somewhat 
broader income base. AGI is usually less than money 
income because certain types of income are excluded in 
calculating AGI. For example, social security, railroad 
retirement, and unemployment compensation are exclud- 
able from gross income. Additionally, certain other items, 
such as contributions to individual retirement accounts, 
can be excluded from AGI. AGI, while not as broad a tax 
Table 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX LIABILITIES UNDER FOUR ALTERNATIVE FLAT-RATE 












Numkr  of Tax 
Expanded Taxable Liablllty 
income Returns 1984 Law 
(thousands) (thousands) (millions) 
Prennt Law 
Numbw of Tax 
Expanded Taxable Liabliity 
Income Returns 1984 Law 





Liability Change Per 




Llablilty Change Per 




Llabllity Change Per 




Liability Change Per 
(millions) (Percent) Return) 
- - - -  
55,000 of Income would be highly uncertain' Some laxpayers at System 2: 18.5 percent tax on ,984 law taxable Income less zero 
that income level currently make use of tax preferences that bracket amount. 
would be terminated under the flat-rate tax, and those taxpayers 
< 52 6,482 403 
5- 10 15,057 5,772 
10- 15 13,092 12,526 
15- 20 10,737 17,462 
20- 30 16,800 44,080 
30- 50 13,568 63,833 
50-1 00 3.580 38,687 
100-200 631 18,656 
> 200 164 16.385 
Total 80,110 217,803 
would thus face substantial tax increases. A particular problem system 3: 15.7 percent tax on ,984 law taxable income l ss zero 
would arise under System 1, in which all income would besubject bracket amount, wlth long-term capital galns ~ncluded 
to tax without exemption or deduction; many households with in full, and no itemized deductions. 
very low incomes who are excused from filing tax returns under 
the 1984 law are therefore not represented in the table, but would System 4: 18.7 percent tax on taxable incomeas in system 3 with 
have to file returns and pay taxes under System 1 The impact of increased exemption and zero bracket amount. 
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SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation. this factor on the table would likely be small, though it would 
lTofacilitatecomparison, 1984lawdoesnotincludetheearned significantly change administrative burdens under the tax 
income credit, the two-earner couple deduction, or the IRA or system. 
Keogh provision. The flat rate tax systemssimilarly do not include 
those provisions. System 1: 11.8 percent tax on adjusted gross Income with long- 
20utcomes under the flat-rate tax for tax returns of under term cap~tal gains ~ncluded in full. 
2,232 453.7 282.1 0 
7,854 36.1 138.26 
15.720 25.5 243.97 
20,778 19.0 308.88 
49,978 13.4 351.06 
66,466 4.1 194.08 
32,658 -15.6 -1,684.20 
12.459 -33.2 -9,821.59 
10,050 -38.7 -38,630.67 
218,194 0.2 4.88 
1,996 395.2 245.71 
5,345 -7.4 -28.33 
12,698 1.4 13.11 
18,802 7.7 124.76 
48.170 9.3 243.45 
68.804 7.8 366.41 
36.1 04 -6.7 -721.60 
14,344 -23.1 -6.833.56 
11,843 -27.7 -27,692.33 
218,106 0.1 3.78 
base as personal income or comprehensive income, 
would be a much broader tax base than taxable income 
( w h i c h  inc ludes exempt ions  and deduc t ions  f r o m  
income). Table 3 presents the estimated revenue which 
would be generated by a 15.5 percent tax on AGI, with no 
other exclusions or exemptions. 
Another possible income base would be personal, or 
money income. Because money income includes items 
such as retirement benefits received, the sum of all 
dividends received, as well as wage and salary income, it 
would be a broader tax base than AGI. Total 1980 money 
income received by families and unrelated individuals 
totaled roughly $1.739.0 bill ion, as reported by the Census 
Bureau.= In order to  generate $248.4 billion in tax revenues, 
a tax rate of 14.3 percent would have to  be applied t o  the 
$1,739.0 f igure, with no exemptions or exclusions. 
Another, still broader tax base would be that provided 
by comprehensive income. Although there are alternative 
definitions as t o  the specific items which can be included 
in a comprehensive income base, under most definitions 
combrehensive income would represent a quite broad tax 
base. For example, in the Treasury study, Blueprints for 
Basic Tax Reform (Blueprints s tudy) ,  a comprehensive 
income definition was developed which includes not only 
net money wage income, but also social security and 
pension benefits received, all realized non-corporate 
capital gains, dividends, and property income, and 
imputed corporate retained earnings.' 
This report examines the fiat tax rates necessary 
to raise 1980 levels of individual income tax 
revenues given various income tax bases, which 
range from the narrow. . .to the quite broad. . . 
The foregoing analysis has presumed the institution of a 
flat-rate tax on income, under various income definitions. 
It would be possible t o  design a simple, yet more progres- 
sive, income tax based on a broad tax base by adjusting 
tax rates or including personal exemptions. However, by 
including exemptions or exclusions from income the in- 
come tax base is narrowed, thus requiring higher tax rates 
in order t o  generate a prescribed amount of revenue. The  
Blueprints study as well as the Brookings study edited by 
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation, presented 
examples of simple and progressive federal income tax 
structures based on comprehensive income which yielded 
equivalent revenues as the then current tax system. Issues 
which are raised in a consideration of progressive versus 
proportional income taxation are more explicit ly dis- 
cussed in the CRS report previously mentioned, Progres- 
sivity in  lncome Taxation: A Pro-Con Discussion. 
6U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series 
P-60. No. 127. Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and 
Persons in the United States: 1980 (Advance Data from the March 
1981 Current Population Survey). U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1981. 
'Another definition of the items to be included in a compre- 
hensive income tax base can be found in: Pechman, Joseph, ed. 
Op. cit. p. 277-298. 
The Treaswy's  Blueprints study included a proposal for 
a simple three-tiered income tax rate structure, based on 
comprehensive income, which would provide the same 
degree of progressivity as that contained in the current tax 
system. The  Treasury tax rates ranged from eight percent 
t o  38 percent on comprehensive incomes of over $40,000, 
and the structure included very few exemptions and 
deductions. The  proposal was designed t o  generate 
revenue equivalent t o  the then current system, and dis- 
tr ibute the tax burden in approximately the same manner 
as the then current system. However, because the tax base 
would have been broadened due t o  the lack of the myriad 
deductions of the then current tax code, tax rates could 
have been lower, and the entire income tax system would 
have been simplified without sacrif icing any of the pro- 
gressivity of the then current tax system. 
In a letter t o  the Senate Appropriations Committee 
dated February 25, 1982, J .  Gregory Ballentine, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, wrote of the tax rates 
and revenue potential of a proportional tax and such a tax 
combined with a surtax on  individual income. He states in 
part: 
This is in response t o  your letter dated November 
30, 1981, regarding a proportional tax rate and 
surtax for individuals. 
In order to  maintain the individual income tax 
liability levels of the 1983 budget, a proportional tax 
on  all individual income would require a tax rate of 
10.6 percent in  1983 increasing t o  11.3 percent in 
1987. If Old Age, Survivors, and Disability (OASDI) 
benefits were excluded from the tax base, and a 20 
percent charitable contributions bredit were al- 
lowed, the required tax rates would be 11.6percent 
in  1983 and 12.4 percent in  1987. 
In your letter you suggest a 10 percent propor- 
tional tax on  all individual income combined with a 
surtax of 15 percent o n  income exceeding $50,000 
and 20 percent o n  income exceeding $100,000. 
Assuming a January 1, 1983, effective date and 
corresponding changes in  tax withholding sched- 
ules, the direct effect of this proposal would be a $25 
bi l l ion reduct ion in  1983 tax receipts and a $30 
bil l ion increase in 1984 and 1985 receipts compared 
to  the 1983 budget. The exclusion of OASDI benefits 
and the allowance of a 20percent charitable contri- 
butions credit would increase the 1983 revenue loss 
t o  $36 bil l ion and reduce the revenue gain to  
approximately $2 bil l ion in  1984 and less than $1 
bil l ion in  1985. 
In arriving at these estimates the new tax base 
includes capital gains, pensions, personal contribu- 
tions to  socialinsurance, and allsources of personal 
money income except income currently associated 
with fraudulent underreporting.8 
Paul Craig Roberts, a former Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Economic Policy, looked at flat income tax 
rates needed t o  balance the 1983 budget using the 
comprehensive base of the Blueprints study. He states: 
An update of  former Treasury Secretary William E. 
Simon's "Blueprints for Tax Reform" (1976) reveals 
OEleven Percent Proportional Tax Needed to Meet 1983 
Revenue Targets. Tax Notes, v. 14, no.11, March 15,1982. p. 705. 
Letter sent to Senate Appropriations Committee. 
TAX NOTES, June 21,1982 
that a 16 percent flat-rate tax o n  persdnal and 
corporate income would balance the 1983 budget. 
There are variations of the flat-rate tax that retain 
elements of progressivity without defeating the pur- 
pose of the tax. A 19 percent flat-rate fax, for 
example, would balance the 1983 budget and allow 
the first $6,000 of income to be excluded from tax. 
That drops the tax rate On a $10,000 income to 7.6 
percent and on a $20,000 income to 13.3 percent. 
Alternatively, an 18 percent flat tax would balance 
the 1983 budget and allow all transfer payments 
including social security to be excluded from the tax 
b a ~ e . ~  
Astudy by Joseph J. Minarik, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Tax Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office,Io 
entitled The Future of the lndividuallncome Tax, contains 
a section on a flat rate income tax. In  his work, Minarik 
examines four flat-rate tax systems: 
System one represents7a gross income tax on AGI 
(including capital gains in full) yielding the equivalent 
of current scheduled 1984 law tax revenues, applied 
to the various tax bases for 1981 income. 
System two represents the change to a flat tax rate 
with currently scheduled 1984 tax law unaltered. 
Under system three, the tax base is made broader by 
including long-term capital gains in full and pro- 
hibiting itemized deductions. 
9Roberts. Paul Craig. How to Break the Stalemate over the 
Budget. Wall Street Journal, May 3. 1982. p. 30. 
'OAs stated on the cover of the Minarik study, the author of that 
paper takes the responsibility for opinions and any errors, and 
none should be attributed to the Congressional Budget Office or 
any of the individuals who helped through comments, advice, or 
execution of portions of the paper. 
The fourth system uses the tax base of the previous 
system but increases relief to low-income taxpayers 
by increasing the personal exemption to $1,500 and 
thezero bracket amount to $3,00Ofor singletaxpayers 
and to $6,000 for joint returns. 
The flat-tax rates necessary under these systems are as 
follows: System 1: 11.8 percent; System 2: 18.5 percent) 
System 3: 15.7 percent; and System 4: 18.7 percent. The 
distribution of tax liabilities under these alternative flat- 
rate systems is shown in Table 4. 
In general, lower income taxpayers would find 
their tax iiablilties greatly increased, while 
upper-income taxpayers would find their tax 
liability greatly reduced, unless large exemp- 
tions are adopted. . . . 
The "proper" amount of progressivity an income tax 
should entail is a judgment which depends upon personal 
notions regarding equity and social utility. Despite one's 
judgment regarding the appropriate degree of progres- 
sivity the federal income tax should embody, it is clear that 
the institution of a flat-rate l.ax on any income base would 
greatly shift the burden of the individual income tax. In 
general, lower-income taxpayers would find their tax 
liabilities greatly increased, while upper-income taxpayers 
would find their tax liability greatly reduced, unless large 
exemptions are adopted which are designed to provide 
income tax relief to lower-income individuals. 
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PROGRESSIVITY IN INCOME TAXATION: A PRO-CON DISCUSSION 
Robe r t  Tannenwald 
Analyst  In Taxat ion and F i s c a l  Pol icy  
Economics  Division 
December  28. 1976 
PROGRESSIVTTY IN INCOibIE TAXATION: -4 PRO-CON DISCUSSION 
Although i t  h a s  been a f e a t u r e  of the F e d e r a l  income tax  fo r  for ty  
y e a r s ,  p rog res s ion  does  not enjoy universa l  support .  Per iodica l ly ,  
a few tax e s p e r t s  propose  a s  a subst i tute  to  the c u r r e n t  income t a s  
a broad-based,  simplified, f l a t - r a t e  sys tem.  F o r  example.  in 1969 
C h a r l e s  0. Galvin, Dean of the Southern Methodist Universi ty  School 
of Law, proposed a comprehensively-based income tax  with a f la t  tax 
11 - 
r a t e  of 13  percent .  Recently,  Russe l l  T ra in ,  D i rec to r  of the 
Envi ronmenta l  Pro tec t ion  Agency and f o r m e r  judge of the United 
S ta tes  Tax  Court ,  advocated a s i m i l a r  tax of 10 pe rcen t  supplemented 
2 1 - 
by an  expenditure  tax. O the r s ,  although not having advocated a 
f l a t - r a t e  tax, have advocated expansion of the tax base with a n  a c r o s s -  
the-board reduct ion in r a t e s  that l eaves  the t a s  nominally l e s s  
p r o g r e s s i v e  than in  i t s  c u r r e n t  f o r m .  In December ,  1975, f o r  
example ,  Sec re t a ry  of the T r e a s u r y  William E. Simon proposed an  
expansion of the income tax b a s e  and the u s e  of r a t e s  ranging roughly 
f rom 10 to 30 o r  40 percent .  Senator Mark Hatfield introduced a hill  
in  the 94th Congres s  (S. 802) proposing a s i m i l a r  sys tem.  
Th i s  r e p o r t  i s  an  evaluation of these  and o the r  base-broadening,  
progress ion- reducing  income tax proposa ls .  It emphas i zes  the i s s u e  
CRS - 2 
of progressivi ty r a the r  than that of income tax base definition. Given 
limitations of time, the discussion in the following pages  is brief,  
failing to do complete justice to the complexity of the i s s u e s  with 
which i t  deals.  
Tax experts  have delineated a t  l eas t  s ix cha rac te r i s t i c s  of a 
des i rable  tax system. These  include equity, efficiency (neutral i ty) ,  
simplicity, lucrat iveness,  effectiveness in promoting stabilization, 
and effectiveness in promoting growth. 
Equitv. At l eas t  three principles of tax equity o r  " fa i rness"  have 
been expounded, none of which is universal ly embraced.  F i r s t ,  some 
argue  that tax burdens should be distributed according to taxpayers '  
"ability to pay. " The incidence of a tax, in otherwords,  should 
reflect  the means  of those who pay it. 
With respect  to income taxation, this principle is usually thought 
to imply the desirabil i ty of progression.  This implication follows 
f r o m  the assumption of declining marginal  utility, i. e., that a dollar  
of income foregone i s  m o r e  valuable to a poor person (who is m o r e  
likely to have spent it  on a necess i ty)  than to  a r ich  person (who i s  
m o r e  likely to have spent i t  on a luxury). A nominally proport ional  
tax, given this hypothesis,  would place a disproportionate tax burden 
on the poor. 
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Proponents  of a f lat-rate tax re jec t  the assumption of declining 
marginal  utility. Even if one accepts  it, they maintain, the concept 
of utility is much too vague to s e r v e  a s  a bas i s  f o r  the distribution 
a 
of tax burdens. They doubt whether one can compare the "utility" 
of one taxpayer with the "utility" of another without making ext remely  
a r b i t r a r y  and subjective judgements. 
Those who argue  in favor of progress ion do not deny that the 
principle of ability to pay and the assumption of declining marginal  
utili ty of income a r e  subjective. They a s s e r t ,  however, that those 
arguing in favor of proportionality a r e  on no f i r m e r  ground. To what 
objective law can the proponents of proportionality r epa i r  in support 
of the i r  conception of a f a i r  tax burden? None, a rgue  the suppor ters  
of progress ion,  because principles of equity a r e  necessar i ly  f i r s t  
principles,  based on values r a t h e r  than fact. 
Some who argue  in favor of proportionality admit  that a 
presumption in favor  of a given pat tern of burden distribution i s  
necessa r i ly  subjec t ive .  Many of them imply that i f  one i s  going to 
choose a r b i t r a r i l y  a guideline f o r  future tax r a t e  s t ruc tu res ,  the 
burden distribution of the cu r ren t  tax sys tem i s  the appropriate one. 
Finding l i t t le  o r  no progress ion in current  effective tax ra t e s ,  these  
tax exper ts  conclude that a f lat  r a t e  tax bet ter  r ep resen t s  cu r ren t  
rea l i t ies  than the cu r ren t  sys tem of progress ive  ra tes .  
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Char les  Galvin, for  example, a f ter  citing evidence that the effective 
r a t e  of the Federa l  income tax does not vary  substantially a c r o s s  
income c lases ,  concludes 
. . . we a r e  not taxing. even now near ly  a s  progress ively  a s  we say 
we a re .  Therefore,  an outright recognition of proportionality 
would recognize rea l i t ies  a s  they a r e  and not a s  the tax tables 
r ep resen t  them to be. 3 /  - 
Russel l  Tra in  argues  along s i m i l a r  l ines:  
I believe current  economic analysis  has in fact concluded that 
the present  overa l l  sys tem,  taking into account the social  
secur i ty  tas ,  is quite definitely r eg ress ive  in i t s  effect in any 
event. . . . there  being s o  lit t le honest progress iv i ty  in the p resen t  
sys tem,  i ts  preservat ion hardly justifies continuance of the p r e -  
sent  m o r a s s  of complexity and special  t reatment.  4 /  - 
Proponents  of progressivi ty cite s tudies which demonstrate that, 
cont rary  to the c l a ims  of Galvin and Tra in ,  the effective r a t e s  of both 
the Federa l  income tax and the overa l l  Federa l  tax s t ruc tu re  a r e  pro-  
gressive.  A study performed by Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave 
indicates that in 1958 effective individual income tax r a t e s  ranged 
from 2. 0 percent  f o r  individuals with incomes under $4, 000 to 18. 5 
percent  fo r  individuals with incomes over  $92, 000 [Table 1, line 11. 
Another study, conducted by Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, 
a lso  concluded that the income tax is progress ive  in i t s  incidence, 
even a f t e r  loopholes and the shifting of taxes a r e  taken into account. 
As  Table 2 indicates, these  two economists found that the i r  resul t s  
var ied  with their  assumptions concerning such shifting. Under one 
s e t  of assumptions, they found that a t  the lower end of the income 
sca le ,  (individuals with adjusted family incomes between 0 and 3 
thousand do l l a r s )  the average  effective r a t e  of the F e d e r a l  income tax 
in 1966 was  1 .4  percent .  The average  effective r a t e  climbed steadily 
with increas ing income until i t  reached a peak of 15. 3 percent  f o r  
individuals with adjusted family incomes between 100 and 500 thousand 
dollars .  The average  effective r a t e  declined a t  higher income levels ,  
falling to 12 .  4 percent  fo r  individuals with adjusted family incomes 
of one million dol lars  o r  more .  This  pat tern of effective r a t e s  did 
not change substantially when different incidence assumptions w e r e  
6 / - 
utilized. 
The r e s u l t s  of these  two studies roughly substantiate 
Russel l  T r a i n ' s  a s se r t ion  that the burden distribution of a l l  Federa l  
taxes  combined i s  proport ional  o r  regress ive .  The conclusions, 
however, depended on the underlying incidence assumptions.  
Musgrave and Musgrave [See Table 1, line 57 and Pechman and Okner 
[See Table 31, when using incidence assumptions the l a t t e r  though were  
regressive:::, found a l l  Federa l  taxes combined w e r e  roughly propor-  
tional a c r o s s  mos t  of the income sca le  although mildly progress ive  
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a t  the lower and upper segments.  However, Pechman and Okner, 
using assumpt ions  they considered to be progressive::":', found the 
burden distribution of a l l  Federa l  taxes combined to be distinctly 
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p r o g r e s s i v e  throughout the income sca le  [See Table 31. 
:: See Table 6 ,  Variant 3b f o r  a description of these assumptions.  
'r* See Table 6, Variant  l c ,  f o r  a description of these assumptions.  
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Some of those who a d h e r e  to the pr inciple  of proport ional i ty  a r g u e  
p rog res s ion  in the F e d e r a l  income tax i s  needed to offset the 
r eg re s s iv i ty  or s t a t e  and loca l  t a se s .  They maintain that  the ove ra l l  
incide6ce of Fede ra l ,  s ta te ,  and local  t a x e s  is proport ional .  Switching 
to a proport ional  F e d e r a l  income tau, therefore ,  would r e n d e r  the 
ove ra l l  incidence r e g r e s s i v e .  
E s t i m a l e s  of the burden dis t r ibut ion of s t a l e  and loca l  t a s e s  a p p e a r s  
to be highly sensi t ive to assumpt ions  concerning how these  t axes  a r e  
shifted. Pechman and Olcner found, under  t he i r  "p rog res s ive"  s e t  of 
assumpt ions  [See Table 6,  Variant  l c ]  that this dis t r ibut ion was  
curv i l inear .  Effective s t a t e  and loca l  tax r a t e s  s t a r t e d  a t  9. 8 pe rcen t  
f o r  individuals in the $0-3 thousand bracket ,  dropped to 6. 5 pe rcen t  
fo r  those in the $10 to $20 thousand bracke t ,  and r o s e  a f t e r  that to 
13. 8 percent  on  incomes  o v e r  $1 mil l ion [See Table 31. Under t he i r  
I I r e g r e s s i v e  s e t  of assumpt ions  [SeeTable 6,  Variant  3b] the burden  
dis t r ibut ion was c l ea r ly  r e g r e s s i v e ,  ranging f ro in  14. 0 pe rcen t  to 
4 . 2  percent  fo r  the lowest  and highest  b racke t s  respec t ive ly  [See 
Table 31. 
Under the p r o g r e s s i v e  s e t  of assumpt ions ,  total  Fede ra l ,  s t a t e ,  
and  loca l  effective r a t e s  w e r e  c l ea r ly  p rog res s ive  in  t he i r  incidence,  
ranging f rom 18. 7 percent  to 49. 3 percent .  Undcr the " r e g r e s s i v e "  
s e t  of assumpt ions ,  ove ra l l  burden dis t r ibut ion was roughly p ro -  
port ional  ranging between 24. 3 and 30. 3 percent .  [See Table  31 
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Some maintain that,  in evaluating the distributive impact  of the 
introduction of a flat r a t e  tax, one mus t  take into account the inci- 
dence of the total budget, expenditures a s  well a s  taxes. Because 
the benefits of public expenditures acc rue  s o  disproportionately to 
lower  inconle individuals, s o  the argument  goes, the cu r ren t  total 
f i sca l  incidence is progress ive .  Reducing o r  eliminating the pro-  
gress iv i ty  of the F e d e r a l  income tax, therefore,  would move this 
incidence c lose r  to proportionality. 
Studies of the distribution of governmental benefits by income 
c l a s s e s  a r e  based on even s t ronger  incidence assumptions than those 
underpinning studies of the burden distribution of taxes. However, 
the r e su l t s  of those studies which have been performed a r e  not overly 
sens i t ive  to these assumptions. Benefit distribution appears  to be 
c l ea r ly  r e g r e s s i v e  (i. e . ,  benefits in general  acc rue  disproportionately 
to the poqr. ) Musgrave and Musprave, f o r  example, est imated that 
benefits f rom a l l  levels  of government in 1959 accruing to individuals 
with incomes under $4, 000 constituted between 123.7 and 180 .4  p e r -  
cent of income. These  est imated percentages  declined steadily with 
income until they reached between 12. 3 and 24. 4 percent  f o r  
individuals with incomes between $35, 000 and $92, 000, (figures were  
not given f o r  individuals with incomes above $92,  000) [See Table 4. 
l ines  19-21]. ILlusgrave and ~ u s g r a v k  found the distribution of net 
benefits and burdens (benefits minus  taxes)  of a l l  levels  of govern- 
ment to be skewed in favor  of the poor. [See Table 5, line 91 
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Some feel  that s tudies such a s  that performed by Musgrave and 
lMusgrave fail  to entertain the possibility that the benefits of public 
goods and se rv ices  acc rue  disproportionately to the r ich  r a t h e r  than 
the poor. Bor is  Bit tker ,  f o r  example, maintains that the benefits 
of governmental expenditures on defense, police, f i r e  protection, and 
adjudication should be distributed in proportion to proper ty  ownership 
because they se rve  p r imar i ly  to protect  proper ty  rights.  Similarly 
he believes that e.upenditures on education, health, and welfare 
generate la rge  amounts of benefits to individuals in high income 
brackets  by improving society in general.  If these  benefits w e r e  
accounted for ,  Bittker concludes, one might even find that overa l l  
f i sca l  incidence in the United States is regress ive  and that intro-  
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ducing a proportional income tax would make it  even m o r e  so. 
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TABLE 1 
Estimated Distributipn of Tax Burdens by Income Breckets, 1968 
flaxes as  Percent of Total Farndv Incornel 
INCOME BRACKETS , 
- 
Under $4 000- $5,700- $7.900- $10.400- $12.500- $17.500- $22,600- $35,500- $92.000- All 
Taxes $4,000 $5,700 $7.900 $10,400 $12,5DO $17.500 $22.600 $35.500 $92.000 ahd over Brackets 
Federal Taxes 
1. Individual income tax 2.0 2.8 5.9 
2. Estate and gift tax - - - 
3. COrporation income tax 5.1 6.1 5.0 
4. Excises and customs 2.5 2.8 3.1 
5. Payroll tax 5.5 6.3 7.0 
6. Total 15.2 17.9 20.8 
7. Total excluding line 5 9.7 1 1.6 13.9 
State and Local Taxes 
8. Individual income tax 
9. Inheritance tax 
10. Corporation income tax 
1 1. General sales tax 
12. Excises 
13. Property tax 
14. Payroll tax 
15. Total 
16. Total excluding line 14 
All Levels 
17. Total 28.5 30.5 32.8 
18. Total excluding lines 
5 and 14 22.9 23.7 25.0 
Source: For brief explanation of estimates, see text. 
Notes: 
Uneven bracket limits are used for computational reasons. 
Line 12: Includes motor vehicle licenses, excises. and miscellaneous revenue. 
Totals may not add due to rounding. 
Source: Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave. Public finance in 
theory and practice. New York, McGraw Hi11 [l973], p. 368. 
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TABLE 2 
Effective Rates of Federal, State, and Local Taxes, by Type 
of Tax, Variants l c  and 3b, by Adjusted Family Income Class, 1966 
Income classes i n  thousands o f  dollars; t a x  rates in percent 
- ~~~~~ 
Personal 
Indi- Corpo- Sales property 
Adjusted viduai ration a n d  and  motor 
family income income Property excise Payroll vehicle Total 












1,000 a n d  over 












1,000 and  over 
Al l  classesb 
Variant 1 c 
2.1 2.5 9.4 
2.2 2.7 7.4 
1.8 2.0 6.5 
1.6 1.7 5.8 
2.0 2.0 5.2 
3.0 2.6 4.6 
Variant 3b 
6.1 6.5 9.2 
5.3 4.8 7.1 
4.3 3.6 6.4 
3.8 3.2 5.6 
3.8 3.2 5.1 
4.0 3.1 4.6 
Source Computed from the 1966 MERGE dato flh. For on erplonotion of the incidence voriontr, seeloble 3-1. 
Note; Voriant I c  i s  the most progr.srive and 3b the Ieost progressive $01 of incidence osrumptims .xomined 
in this study. 
Less thon 0.05 percent. 
b lnclv>r-r negative incomes not shown seporotdy. 
Source: Joseph A .  Pechman and Benjamin A .  Okner. 
Who bears t h e  t ax  burden? Washington, Brookings 
I n s t i t u t i o n  [1974], p. 59. 
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TABLE 3 
Effective Rates of Federal and State-Local Taxes, Variants 
lc and 3b, by Adjusted Family Income Class, 1966 
Income classes i n  thousands o f  dollars; tax rates i n  percent 
Adjusted Variont 1 c Variont 36 
income Fedeml Sfafe-local Total Federal State-local Tot01 
25-30 17.4 7.7 25.1 17.2 7.1 24.3 
30-50 18.2 8.2 26.4 17.7 6.7 24.4 
50-1 00 21.8 9.7 31.5 20.1 6.3 26.4 
100-500 30.0 11.9 41.8 24.4 6.0 30.3 
500-1,000 34.6 13.3 48.0 25.2 5.1 30.3 
1,000 and over 35.5 13.8 49.3 24.8 4.2 29.0 
Source: Computed from the 1966 MERGE data file. For on explanation of the incidence voriontr, see Tablo 3-1. 
Details may not odd to totals becouse of rounding. 
Note, Variant I c  i s  tho mort progressive and 3b'tho least progrenivo set of incidence assumptions examined 
in this study. 
Includes negative incomes not shown separately. 
Source: Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner. Who bears 
the tax burden ? Washington, Brookings Institution [ I  9741, 
p. 62. 
CRS - 12 
TABLE 4 
Distribution of Expenditure Benefits 
(Benefits as Percent of Total Family Income) 
SELECTED INCOME BRACKETS 
Under $4.000- $5.700- $7,900- $12,500- $35.500- 
$4.000 $5,700 $7.900 $10,400 $17,500 $92.000 All 
I. SPECIFIC BENEFIT ALLOCATIONS 
Federal 
1. Purchases: Education 0.6 1.1 1.1 I .O 0.6 0.2 0.6 
2. Interest 2.1 2.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.5 
3. Highways 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.6 
4. Agriculture * 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.6 0.7 
5. Medical 1.9 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.2 * 0.4 
6. Total 5.2 5.9 4.5 3.3 2.6 5.3 3.8 
7. Transfers 78.3 19.8 8.8 4.3 2.1 0.2 6.2 
8. Total 83.5 25.7 13.3 7.6 4.7 5.5 10.0 
State and Local 
9. Purchases: Education 5.5 9.9 10.4 8.7 5.4 1.5 5.2 
10. Interest 0.1 0.1 * t 1; 0.1 * 
I I. Highways 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 0.5 1.3 
12. Medical 5.7 5.6 2.9 1.5 0.5 0.1 1.1 
13. Total 12.5 17.2 15.2 12.0 7.4 2.2 7.7 
14. Transfers 14.5 1.6 0.6 0.2 L * 0.7 
15. Total 27.1 18.7 15.8 12.2 7.4 2.2 8.4 
All Levels 
16. Purchases 17.8 23.0 19.7 15.3 10.0 7.5 11.5 
17. Transfers 92.8 21.4 9.4 4.5 2.1 0.2 6.9 
18. Total 110.6 44.4 29.1 19.8 12.1 7.7 18.4 
II. TOTAL BENEFIT ALLOCATION 
All Levels 
19. Variant A 127.3 61.1 45.8 36.5 28.8 24.4 35.1 
20. Variant B 123.7 58.9 45.2 36.3 29.2 24.5 35.1 
2 1. Variant C 180.4 77.0 57.9 40.8 26.2 12.3 35.1 
*Less than 0.05 percent. 
Notes: Lines 2 and 10: Interest is included here under purchases, although according to na- 
tional income accounts i t  should appear as a separate category. 
Lines 19, 20. 21: For explanation, see text. 
Source: Richard A .  Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave. Public 
finance in theory and practice. New York, McGraw Hill 
[1973], p .  373. 
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TABLE 5 
Distribution of Net Benefits and Burdens 
(Net as Percent of Total Family Income) 
INCOME BPACKETS 
Under $4,000- $5.700- $7.900- $10,400- $12,500- $17.500- $22,600- $35,500- $92,000 
$4.000 $5,700 $7.900 $10,400 $1 2,500 $17,500 $22,600 $35,500 $92.000 and over 
Federal 
1. Specific allocation 
2. General, variant A 
3. Total 
State and Local 
4. Specific allocation 
5. General, variant A 
6. Total 
Al l  Levels 
7. Specific allocation 
8. General, variant A 
9. Total 
Notes: Lines 2. 5. and 8: General expenditures are allocated in propornon to family income levels and tax distributions as in 
Table 15-1. 
'Less than 0.05 
Source: Richard A .  Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave. Pub1 ic  finance in 
theory and practice. New York, McGraw Hill [1973], p. 375. 
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TABLE 6 
Tax Incidence Assumptions Used in Pechman-Okner Study 
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 
Tax and basis o f  ollocotion o b c o b  a b c  
lndividuol income fox 
To taxpayers 
Soles and excise foxes 
To consumption o f  taxed commodities 
Corporofion income fox 
To dividends 
To property income in generol 
Half to dividends; holf to property 
income in general 
Half to dividends; one-fourth to con- 
sumption;one-fourth to employee 
compensation 
Half to property income in general; 
half to consumption 
Property fox on Iond 
To Iondowners 
To property income in generol 
Property tax on improvemenfs 
To shelter ond consumption 
To property income in general 
Holf to shelter and conrumption; half 
to property income in generol 
Poyroll fox on employees 
TO employee compensation 
Poyroll fox on employers 
To employee compensation 
Holf to employee compensation; holf 
to consumption -- 
-- - 
X X X  X X  X X X  
X X X  X X  X X X  
X X X  X X  X X X  
X  X . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
Source: Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner. Who bears the tax 
burden? Washington, Brookings Institution 119741, p. 38. 
Some proponents of a f lat-rate income tax have advocated the 
maintenance of a degree of progress ion in the tax s t r u c t r u r e  through 
a n  expenditure tax with a l a rge  exemption. This  suggestion was made 
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m o s t  recently by Russe l l  E. Train.  Because consumption a s  a 
proportion of income dec reases  with income, the exemption would 
have to be huge in o r d e r  to make the tax progress ive .  
Some tax analysts  re jec t  the ability to pay principle a s  a guide- 
line to tax equity in favor  of the "benefit" principle. According to 
this  principle,  tax burdens should be allocated according to the 
value of the benefits generated by public goods and se rv ices .  
Obviously, the implications of this principle f o r  the des i rable  amount 
of progress ion in the income tax depends on one ' s  beliefs concerning 
the distribution of benefits by income c lass .  Because Bor is  Bit tker  
believes that this  distribution is skewed in favor of high income 
individuals, he u s e s  the benefit principle to  defend the cu r ren t  pro-  
g ress ive  r a t e  s t ruc ture .  
I I F o r  o thers ,  horizontal equity" r a the r  than the ability-to-pay o r  
benefit principles i s  the most  important c r i t e r ion  fo r  evaluating 
taxes. In shor t  this principle s t a t e s  that individuals with equal 
incomes should bear  equal tax burdens rega rd less  of the sources  of 
incomes. Many existing tax preferences  violate this principle. F o r  
esample ,  o ther  things being equal, a taxpayer who e a r n s  h is  income 
through the realization of capital gains pays l e s s  in taxes  than one 
whose source  of income i s  sa lary .  Thus, much base-broadening is 
advocated under the banner of horizontal equity, too. 
Some believe that the principle per ta ins  to the i s sue  of 
progress iv i ty  a s  well. It h a s  been argued that proper ty  income should 
be taxed m o r e  heavily than earned income because i t  is m o r e  certain.  
A progress ive  income tax ra te  s t ruc tu re  effects this differential,  
s ince property income a s  a percentage of total income i n c r e a s e s  a s  
one proceeds up the income scale.  
Before leaving i s sues  of equity, one should note that not even the 
mos t  adamant inherents  to a proportional income tax s t ruc tu re  be- 
l ieve that income below subsistence level  (however that may be 
defined) should be subject to income taxation. How subsistence 
income is f reed f r o m  taxation af fec ts  the progress iv i ty  of overa l l  bud- 
get incidence. The advocates of Senator Hatfield's s impliform proposal 
p ra i se  i t  fo r  i t s  use  of c red i t s  r a t h e r  than exemptions o r  deductions 
. 7 1  - 
in achieving this goal. The credit, i s  a m o r e  p rogress ive  ins t rument  
of tax relief than a deduction o r  exemption. While the tax savings 
resulting f rom a dollar  of exemption depends on the taxpayer ' s  rna r -  
g i n 4  tax ra te ,  the tax savings resulting f rom a dol lar ' s  worth of 
credi t  is the s a m e  f o r  everyone, r ega rd less  of that rate .  
Some argue  that every  dollar  or income should be subicct to 
taxation. These individuals believe that the subsistence problem 
should be rcrnetiicd thr-ough the expcnditurc s idc of thc budget. 
CRS - 17 
EFFICIENCI-  (NEUTRALITY) 
One of the 1no.st fundamental canons of ma ins t ream economic 
theory and the ideology of capital ism is that purely competitive 
m a r k e t s  a r e  m o s t  efficient. Left alone, such marke t s  will sa t i s fy  
consunler  preference  in the cheapest possible way. A corollary of 
this  b a s i c  tenet i s  that a tax sys tem should d is tor t  private economic 
decisions.rnade under purely competitive conditions a s  li t t le a s  
possible. 
Many opponents of progression believe that it  d is tor ts  the 
pa t tern  of s e v e r a l  types of  economic decisions. F i r s t ,  it allegedly 
d is tor ts  the worker ls  choice between labor  and l iesure ,  causing him 
to choose legs  of the f o r m e r  and m o r e  of the la t te r .  This  distortion 
resu l t s  f rom the penalty that progressivi ty imposes  on the worker  
for  attempting to rnove up the income scale.  In combination with 
the c u r r e n t  e ros ion of the income tax base, it a l so  induces tax- 
payers  to waste t ime and energy in seeking ways to avoid the 
onerous effects of pr*gxessivity. 
With re spec t  to the purported impact  of progressivi ty on work 
effort,  one could argue  that reducing progressivi ty might dec rease  
a s  well a s  inc rease  such effort. with each hour worked o r  each 
increment  in  efSo~-t garnering a l a r g e r  net wage, the worker  who - 
l a b o r s  until he  has  achieved a fixed iricome level  might reduce 
h i s  eMort, reasoning that he need w o r k  l e s s  to achieve that level. 
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Anyway it i s  not c l ea r  that people have e i ther  the capacity o r  the 
des i re  to a l t e r  the i r  work effort  in  response to  changes in net sa lary .  
As f o r  the argument that progress iv i ty  l eads  people to waste t ime 
and energy in seeking ways to avoid i t s  impact,  f i r s t  removing avenues 
of avoidance through the enactment of a comprehensive income base  
would drast ical ly reduce  this type of behavior, even if proportionality 
were  not enacted. Secondly, one could argue  that people would spend 
almost  a s  much t ime in the pursuit  of. tax she l t e r s  even with a pro-  
portional ra te  s t ruc ture ,  s imply because i t  is natural  to at tempt to 
minimize tax liabilit ies under any circumstances.  
It should a lso  be noted that the broadening of the income tax 
would eliminate important investment incentives current ly  embedded 
in the income tax s t ruc ture ,  such a s  favorable t rea tment  of long- 
t e r m  capital gains, the investment tax credit ,  and accelera ted  
depreciation. Thus, even if one maintains that the crea t ion  of a 
proportional income tax r a t e  s t ruc tu re  would st imulate investment, 
i t  does not follow that a complete base-broadening progress ion-  
reducing proposal would. Besides, the re  a r e  ways of stimulating 
saving and investment through the expenditure s ide and through 
the monetary sys tem which might be just a s  effective a s  changes 
in tax policy. 
As  f o r  Russel l  T r a i n ' s  suggestion that a consumption tax be 
enacted, one could argue  that such a tax would r e v e r s e  the 
direction of the distortion in the consumption/ savings decision 
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a s  well dampen consumer demand. Yet the strength of consumer 
demand i s  an important factor  in the investment decision. T r a i n ' s  
proposal,  therefore  might have only a l imited effect on capital for -  
mation. In response,  one could argue  that the government could 
maintain overa l l  demand strength through monetary policy and the 
espenditure s ide  of the budget. 
SIhIPLICITY 
T h e r e  i s  a general  agreement  that taxes should be simple to 
collect and s imple  to comply with. Many believe that the current  
sys tem i s  excessively co.mplex. The multitude of schedules, the 
number  of operat ions the taxpayer must  perform in o r d e r  to de ter -  
mine his o r  h e r  tax liability, the increasingly f requent  necessi ty of 
obtaining professional  ass is tance  to f i l l  out r e tu rns  have imposed a 
substantial  burden on the public, diverting i t s  energies  f rom m o r e  
productive act ivi t ies ,  This  burden purportedly has  contributed to 
the disillusionment of the American people with government in 
general.  
A broad-based p r a p o r t i m a l  tax, so  i t s  suppor ters  argue,  would 
el iminate much of this  complexity, Eliminating tax preferences  
. - 
obviously would simplify the sys tem.  Eliminating o r  reducing pro-  
gress ion  in the r a t e  s t ruc tu re  would st i f le  the motivation to re ins ta te  
those prcl 'erences. 
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Some maintain. however, that broadening the t a s  base  would 
generate as much complexity as i t  would eliminate. Bor i s  Bittker 
has  argued that base expansion would c rea te  new valuation problems 
not r a i sed  under current  law, par t icular ly  i f  unreal ized appreciat ion 
and depreciation, the m a r k e t  value of annuities, and imputed income 
f rom the ownership of property become tasable. Fur the rmore ,  he 
argues ,  base augmentation might requi re  distinctions noL required 
under the present  system. F o r  example, if deductions of personal  
expenditures a r e  disallowed, it would be necessa ry  to establish 
viable c r i t e r i a  fo r  the i r  identification and distinction f r o m  business -. 
expenses. How will such a distinction be m a d e ?  Bit tker  gives 
severa l  examples of situations in which the distinction would be 
difficult. Would the person injured in the course  of his  work be 
permit ted to deduct the physician's bill a s  a business expense? 
Would an individual be able i o  deduct the in teres t  on h i s  home m o r t -  
gage i f  he  incurred o r  continued the debt in o r d e r  to finance a 
business o r  purchase investment secur i t i e s?  These examples give 
a taste, according to Bittker,  of the complexity that base-broadening 
could entail. 
The f lat-rate consunlption t a s  with a l a rge  exemption, which 
Russel  Tra in  has  suggested a s  a progress ive  supplemcnt to income 
taxation, would entail  enormous adminstrat ive complexities.  
R'lusg~.ave and h'lusgr.ave have suggested that the mos t  feasible 
procedure  for  determining the taxpayer ' s  annual consumption would 
be the following: 
1. Record the bank balances a t  the beginning of the y e a r  
2. Add receip ts  
3.  Add net  borrowing (borrowing minus  debt repayment o r  
lending) 
4. Subtract net investment (costs  of a s s e t s  purchased minus 
proceeds  f rom a s s e t s  sold)  
5.  Subtract bank balances a t  end of the y e a r  
The result ing f igure would equal consumption f o r  the year .  
This  procedure  would r a i s e  many problems. F i r s t  of a l l  imputed 
consumption--e. g., housing and gome grown food--would have to be 
included if the tax base  is to ref lec t  a l l  consumption. Secondly, 
borrowing must  be accounted for.  Such accounting would be difficult 
when the c red i to r s  a r e  institutions, not subject to the expenditure tax. 
The expenditure tax would a l so  have to deal with the problem of 
long-lived consumption goods, such a s  housing. These might be 
taxed e i the r  a s  imputed consumption over  the i r  useful life, o r  a t  the 
t ime of initial outlay, with appropriate averaging permitted. Diffi- 
cul t ies  might  a lso  a r i s e  in distinguishing between consumption and 
investment. Several  expenditures have both consumption and 
investment charac ter is t ics ,  e. g. . education o r  the pur-chase of - 
s h a r e s  in 3 country club. Finally, i t  might be possible Tor a high- 
consumption taxpayer to escape  the tax by convincing a low 
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consumption taxpayer to make purchases  fo r  him, dropping both 
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below the tax-free level  in the process .  
STAB ILIZA T I 0  N 
It is desirable f o r  a tax to promote stable p r i c e s  and dampen 
swings in the business cycle. P rogress ion  h a s  often been pra ised  a s  
an automatic s tabi l izer  that a s s i s t s  the tax sys tem in achieving 
these goals. When the economy is booming and incomes a r e  
increasing,  the bite of progress ion modera tes  the expansion, 
thereby allegedly controlling inflationary forces .  When the 
economy is declining and incomes a r e  decreasing,  the average  m a r -  
ginal tax ra t e  declines under a progress ive  r a t e  s t ruc ture .  As  a 
consequence the reduction in  disposable income result ing f r o m  the 
recess ion and concomitant reductions in demand and employment 
a r e  moderated. 
Opponents of the degree  of progress ion current ly  featured in the 
income tax c la im that the r a t e  s t ruc tu re  not only dampens expansion 
but r e t a rds  recovery.  In otherwords they claim that progress ion has  
such an oppressive effect on the economy that i t  prevents  i t  f rom 
achieving i t s  potential. 
Growth -- 
It has  been alleged that progress iv i ty  dampens growth because - 
i t  fal ls  m o r e  heavily on savings than does a prroport ional  o r  r e g r e s -  
sive income tax. This  argument follows f rom the assumption that 
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the marginal  propensity to save inc reases  with income, i. e .  , that 
fami l ies  k i t h  relat ively high incomes tend to change their  savings 
by a l a r g e r  fract ion of a change in the i r  disposal income than do 
fami l i e s  with relat ively lpw incomes. Studies designed to t e s t  the 
impact  of progress iv i ty  on savings have found that a p rogress ive  tax 
does in fact  fal l  m o r e  heavily on savings than would a proportional 
income tas .  The studies d isagree  on the extent of the differences 
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in impact on savings of these al ternaive tax r a t e  s t ruc tures .  
Some economis ts  refute the claim that an income tax which 
falls heavily on savings will reduce household savings. Those 
embracing this a rgument  a s s u m e  that the s a v e r  h a s  a fixed 
savings target ;  fo r  example, adequate r e t i r ement  o r  enough to p ro -  
vide for  h i s  chi ldren 's  education. If the s a v e r ' s  income i s  reduced, 
he will  have to save a t  a g r e a t e r  r a t e  in o r d e r  to meet  h is  target .  
Reddcing tax r a t e s  and progressivi ty,  i t  follows, would dec rease  the 
r a t e  of saving by higher income tax payers.  This effect might off- 
s e t  the g r e a t e r  tendency of higher income people to substitute savings 
f o r  consumption when the i r  disposable incomes a r e  increased.  
YIELD (LUCRATIVENESS) 
Advocates of base-broadening and progression-reduction point 
out that augmentation of the tax base  would pe rmi t  r a t e  reduction 
without revenue loss .  Galvin,for example, suggests  that under h i s  
proposed f lat-rate tax, the income tax ra t e  could be se t  a t  13 per-  
cent without any l o s s  in revenue. Tra in  suggests  that ra te  could 
be a s  low a s  10 percent  under his scheme. Some even contend that 
revenues would inc rease  under plans such a s  those of Galvin and 
Tra in  because the st imulus provided by their  proposed r a t e  reduc-  
tions would increase  taxable income. 
Introducing a 10 o r  13 percent  flat r a t e  income tax without 
reducing revenue below i t s  cu r ren t  level would be possible only if  
the income t a s  base were  broadened to include unrealized capital  
gains, whose identity a s  "income" i s  a point of contention among 
economists  and accountants. Otherwise, even if a l l  national income 
were  included in the tax base, with no exemptions, deductions, o r  
exclusions, a I 6  percent  r a t e  would be necessa ry  to  avoid revenue 
losses .  In evaluating Galvin's and T r a i n ' s  proposals ,  one should 
keep in mind the ex t reme  nature  of the base  broadening involved. 
As for  the argument that revenues would actually inc rease  under 
these proposals  because of their  sizeable s t imulus to the economy, 
one can point out that no concrete evidence has  been unearthed that 
the proposals  would have such a l a rge  impact  on taxable income. 
FURTHER COMMENTS 
severa l  of those who have advocated simplified income taxes with 
reductions in progress ion have discussed integration of the individual 
income tax with o ther  Federa l  taxes, such a s  the corporat ion income 
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tax and the payroll tax. Although these questions a r e  important,  tXey 
a-k.e beyond the scope of this report .  
One's  beliefs concerning the appropriate degree of progress iv i ty  
fii Federa l  irrcofie taxation a r e  important  components of h is  im-3ge of 
C j ~ s t  society. The issue of progressivi ty ultimately mus t  be resolved 
;& tlie bas is  of value judgements, not on deductions based on objective 
laws .  
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